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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
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SUPERINTENDENT OF NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE, 
Col. Carl A. Williams 
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District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson 
_____________ 
 
Argued on November 15, 2011 
 
BEFORE: FUENTES and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, International 
Trade Judge  
 
(Opinion Filed: December 6, 2011) 
 
 
Thomas Bruno (ARGUED) 
Abramson & Denenberg, P.C. 
1315 Walnut Street, 12th Floor 
Philadelphia, PA 19107 
                                                 
 Honorable Jane A. Restani, International Trade Judge of the United States Court of 
International Trade, sitting by designation. 
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John C. Connell 
John P. Kahn 
Maureen T. Coghlan 
Archer & Greiner, P.C. 
One Centennial Square 
Haddonfield, New Jersey 08033 
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Office of the Attorney General of New Jersey 
P.O. Box 112 
25 Market Street 
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 
Trenton, NJ 08625 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
 
Christopher Morris appeals from the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment 
to the Appellees on his malicious prosecution and selective prosecution claims.  While he 
recognizes that, in order to bring a malicious prosecution claim, he must show that his 
criminal case was “favorably terminated,” he argues that the District Court held him to 
too high of a standard in resolving this question.  Morris also argues that he put forward 
sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that he had been selectively prosecuted.  
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For the reasons expressed below, we will affirm the District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment to the Appellees.
1
 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we set forth only the 
facts and history that are relevant to our conclusion.  On June 1, 1997, Christopher 
Morris, an African American male, was stopped by two New Jersey State Troopers, 
Glynn Moore and Marc Stephens, on the New Jersey Turnpike.  The Troopers testified 
that they stopped Morris because he was speeding.  Moreover, because Morris‟ car had 
tinted windows, the Troopers say that it was not until the car came to a stop that they 
were able to observe that Morris and his passenger, Andre London, were African 
American.  The Troopers testified that they became suspicious because Morris and 
London made furtive movements and appeared nervous, among other reasons.  
According to the Troopers, Morris and London were subjected to Terry pat down 
searches, and were each discovered to be carrying a large, duct-taped package of 
cocaine.  Morris now disputes this version of events, and instead alleges that the Troopers 
searched him three times and found nothing.  It is his claim that the Troopers planted the 
cocaine on him, and he insists that he had no contraband on his person or in his car, 
except for a small amount of marijuana.   
Morris was charged with possession with intent to distribute a Controlled 
Dangerous Substance.  He filed a Motion to Suppress the cocaine on the ground that the 
                                                 
1The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 
original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343.  We have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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pat-down search was illegal and the contraband was illegally seized.  He did not, at that 
time, raise a claim that the cocaine had been planted on him by the Troopers.  His motion 
was denied.   
Morris‟ arrest and criminal prosecution came at a time when the New Jersey State 
Police were under scrutiny for using racial profiling in their traffic stops.  In 1999, the 
New Jersey Attorney General‟s office published an interim report following an 
investigation into the racial profiling allegations.  The Attorney General concluded that 
the State Police did not have an official policy of racial profiling, but he nevertheless 
found widespread de facto discrimination by officers who racially profiled motorists on 
the Turnpike.  Morris filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the suppression issue based 
on this report, but this motion was also denied.  Finally, Morris filed a Motion to Reopen 
the Discovery based on newly discovered evidence of racial profiling.  This motion was 
denied, and Morris‟ criminal case went to trial.  His first trial was declared a mistrial, 
however, after jurors were found discussing the matter during lunch. 
        During jury selection for Morris‟ second trial, the judge became aware of three 
Appellate Division decisions that had been issued concerning discovery in cases 
allegedly involving racial profiling.  The trial judge thus granted Morris‟ Motion to 
Reopen Discovery.  Morris‟ case was referred to a special proceeding to determine 
whether pending criminal cases such as his could go forward.  On February 26, 2001, the 
Attorney General moved to dismiss 76 pre-trial cases being reviewed, including Morris‟, 
because it was too difficult to “„discern which cases involve[d] intentional targeting of 
minorities when other drug courier profile-related factors existed to justify the 
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stop.‟”  Morris v. Verniero, No. 03-1001, 2008 WL 4330179 at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 
2008).  Morris‟ indictment was dismissed on March 23, 2001. 
On March 7, 2003, Morris filed this civil rights action against several defendants, 
including Troopers Moore and Stephens, Attorney General Peter Verniero, First Assistant 
Attorney General Paul Zoubeck, and Colonel Carl Williams.  He alleged claims arising 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution and selective prosecution.  The 
Appellees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on statute of limitations grounds, but 
District Judge Thompson denied this motion.  The Appellees then filed a Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment, addressing the substantive issues in the case.  Judge Thompson 
granted this motion and dismissed the case. 
This notice of appeal followed. 
II. 
We exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment.   
Summary judgment may be granted if, drawing all inferences in favor of 
the nonmoving party, “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”   
Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c)).   
A. Malicious Prosecution 
To prove malicious prosecution a plaintiff must show, among other things, that 
that “the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding” and that this “criminal proceeding 
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ended in the plaintiff‟s favor.”  Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)).  As we have 
noted, the  favorable termination requirement serves “to avoid „the possibility of the 
claimant succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the underlying 
criminal prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial policy against the creation of 
two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction.‟”  Id. at 187 
(quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)).  In keeping with this purpose, “we 
have held that a prior criminal case must have been disposed of in a way that indicates 
the innocence of the accused in order to satisfy the favorable termination element.”  Id.  
While Morris is correct that “[a]ctual innocence is not required for a common law 
favorable termination,” Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996), the termination 
must at least be indicative of Morris‟ innocence.   
As we have stated, “[a] plaintiff may attempt to indicate his innocence by 
demonstrating that his prior criminal proceeding terminated . . . [due to] the formal 
abandonment of the proceedings by the public prosecutor . . . .”  Kossler 564 F.3d at 187.  
Morris argues that the Attorney General formally abandoned his case, thereby indicating 
his innocence of the crimes charged.  However, we do not consider all administrative 
decisions to abandon prosecutions to be favorable terminations.  See, e.g., Donahue v. 
Gavin, 280 F.3d 371 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that a prosecutor‟s decision to dismiss a case 
in the interest of judicial economy did not constitute a favorable termination).   
In Morris‟ case, we cannot say that the dismissal of his case constituted a 
favorable termination because it was not indicative of his innocence of the crimes 
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charged.  The Attorney General clearly stated that he did not dismiss Morris‟ indictment 
because he thought Morris was innocent.  On the contrary, in his public announcement 
regarding the dismissal, the then-Attorney General said, “„let‟s be clear; the defendants in 
these cases may have prevailed in their motions to suppress, but they are criminals 
nonetheless.  All were carrying some form of contraband for distribution in communities 
in this and other states.‟”  Appellees‟ Br. 16.   
Nor can we say that Morris‟ assertion that the cocaine was planted on him creates 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his case was favorably terminated.  There 
are many reasons to discredit Morris‟ assertion, first raised almost six years after his 
initial arrest, that he did not possess the cocaine.
2
  Among these are the fact that the state 
court judge who heard testimony pursuant to Morris‟ suppression motion found Trooper 
Moore to be “truthful, trustworthy, persuasive and detailed” and saw “no reason to doubt 
his testimony” that he and his partner recovered cocaine from Morris‟ person.  R. 521.  
We have noted that, “if the nonmoving party‟s evidence, when viewed in the context of 
all of the evidence, could not be credited by a rational juror, summary judgment may be 
granted.”  U.S. v. 717 S. Woodward St., 2 F.3d 529, 533 (3d Cir. 1993).  Because no 
rational juror could have credited Morris‟ belated assertion that the drugs were planted, 
the District Court properly granted summary judgment to the Appellees. 
                                                 
2
 Morris‟ counsel submitted a letter to this Court after oral argument in which he stated 
that Morris actually did raise his claim that the drugs were planted on him during his 
criminal trial.  Specifically, counsel pointed us to two questions that defense counsel 
asked at trial during her cross examination of Trooper Moore.  However, these two 
isolated questions are insufficient to show that Morris raised a claim that the drugs were 
planted on him at that time.   
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B. Selective Prosecution 
“A decision to prosecute is selective and violates the right to equal protection 
when it is made on a discriminatory basis with an improper motive.”  United States v. 
Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1989).  To establish a claim of selective 
prosecution, a plaintiff must, among other things, “provide evidence that persons 
similarly situated have not been prosecuted.”  Id.  Morris actually “acknowledges in this 
case that he did not produce evidence to „show that similarly situated individuals of a 
different race were not prosecuted.‟”  Appellant‟s Br. 48.  However, he believes that his 
claim should succeed nonetheless because he “produced ample statistical evidence of 
bias.”  Id.   
The District Court properly concluded that this evidence was unavailing.  Judge 
Thompson noted that the statistical evidence, “at best, establish[es] that the New Jersey 
State Police maintained a de facto policy of racial profiling in the course of effecting 
traffic stops.”  Morris v. Verniero, No. 03-1001, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71187 at *16 
(D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2008).  She added that the statistical evidence did not “provide insight 
as to whether similarly situated suspects of a different race than [Morris] were prosecuted 
when violations of the drug laws were found.”  Id.  Morris‟ selective prosecution claim 
fails because he did not prove this necessary element.   
III. 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment to the Appellees. 
